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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
  This appeal, which arises from a bankruptcy 
proceeding, presents only one issue, but it is an issue of first 
impression in this Circuit and requires interpretation and 
reconciliation of two important and complex federal statutory 
schemes and their underlying policies.  Specifically, it 
requires us to decide whether under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”), as amended by the 
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (“MPPAA”), 
the portion of withdrawal liability that is attributable to the 
post-petition time period constitutes an administrative 
expense entitled to priority under the Bankruptcy Code.  The 
District Court, overturning the Bankruptcy Court decision, 
held that it does and that the post-petition portion of the 
multiemployer fund‟s withdrawal liability claim against 
debtor Marcal Paper Mills, Inc. was entitled to priority.  
Marcal Paper Mills, LLC (hereafter “Marcal LLC”), who 
purchased the assets of the debtor Marcal Paper Mills, Inc. 
(hereafter “Marcal”) and assumed liability for this claim, 
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appeals, arguing that the entire claim for withdrawal liability 




Marcal, which manufactured paper products, operated 
a fleet of trucks to distribute its products.  The truck drivers 
employed by Marcal were members of Teamsters Union 
Local 560.  Local 560 was the collective bargaining 
representative for those employees and, over the years, 
entered into a series of collective bargaining agreements 
(“CBAs”) with Marcal.  As part of the CBAs, Marcal was 
required to participate in the Trucking Employees of North 
Jersey Welfare/Pension Fund (“TENJ Pension Fund” or 
“Fund”) — a multiemployer defined benefit pension fund.     
  
On November 30, 2006, Marcal filed a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition and Marcal operated as a debtor-in-
possession (“DIP”) from that date, continuing to employ 
members of Local 560.  The CBA governing the employees‟ 
work and requiring Marcal‟s participation in the TENJ 
Pension Fund did not expire until September 15, 2007.  
Aware that the CBA was set to expire, on August 16, 2007, 
DIP Marcal and Local 560 entered into a Memorandum of 
Understanding continuing the terms of the CBA until a new 
contract could be negotiated.  The parties were never able to 
negotiate a new contract.  Nevertheless, because the CBA and 
pension plan were continued and DIP Marcal continued to 
employ covered employees, those employees accrued pension 
credits and the corresponding benefits.  In addition, under the 
continued-CBA DIP Marcal was required to satisfy its TENJ 
Pension Fund obligations.  One of those obligations was that 
DIP Marcal continue to make contributions to the TENJ 
Pension Fund on behalf of covered employees.  DIP Marcal 
made all such contributions from November 30, 2006, the 
date of its Chapter 11 petition, until May 30, 2008, when DIP 
Marcal‟s assets were sold to Marcal Paper Mills, LLC.  From 
that date, Marcal LLC ceased to employ Local 560 truck 
drivers.  Accordingly, there is no dispute that Marcal LLC 
had no obligation to make contributions or provide benefits 




As a consequence of DIP Marcal‟s cessation and the 
fact that Marcal LLC did not employ Local 560 drivers, the 
TENJ Pension Fund determined that DIP Marcal had made a 
“complete withdrawal” from the pension fund within the 
meaning of ERISA, as amended by the MPPAA.  The TENJ 
Pension Fund assessed Marcal with $5,890,128 in total 
withdrawal liability.  On July 29, 2008, the TENJ Pension 
Fund filed a claim in Marcal‟s bankruptcy proceeding for the 
entire amount of withdrawal liability as a post-petition 
administrative claim under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Marcal objected to the TENJ Pension 
Fund‟s claim that the withdrawal liability be classified as an 
administrative expense and filed a motion to reclassify it as a 
general unsecured claim.  In response, the TENJ Pension 
Fund altered its claim and only sought administrative priority 
for that portion of the withdrawal liability attributable to post-
petition services provided by Local 560 employees to DIP 
Marcal.   
  
Notwithstanding, the Bankruptcy Court rejected TENJ 
Pension Fund‟s claim and reclassified the entire withdrawal 
liability claim as a general unsecured claim.  The District 
Court subsequently reversed and held that the portion of the 
withdrawal liability attributable to the post-petition period 
was entitled to priority.  It remanded the matter to the 
Bankruptcy Court to calculate how the claim should be 
apportioned between pre- and post-petition periods.  Trucking 
Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc., v. Marcal Paper Mills, 




    
The District Court had jurisdiction over the appeal of 
the Bankruptcy Court‟s classification of the claim pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).   Under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), we have jurisdiction of “appeals from all 
final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered” by a 
district court pursuant to its authority to hear appeals from 
final judgments, orders, and decrees entered by a bankruptcy 
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court.  We have held that because of the unique nature of 
bankruptcy cases, finality under § 158(d)(1) should be viewed 
“in a more pragmatic and less technical way” than it would 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  F/S Airlease II, Inc. v. Simon (In re 
F/S Airlease II, Inc.), 844 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1988).   
 
To determine whether a decision is final, we consider 
three factors: (1) “the impact of the matter on the assets of the 
bankruptcy estate,” (2) “the preclusive effect of a decision on 
the merits,” and (3) “whether the interests of judicial 
economy will be furthered.”  Id. at 104.  Consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent, we hold that the District Court‟s 
decision classifying the post-petition portion of withdrawal 
liability as an administrative expense was final, and that 
judicial economy is served by resolving this issue now, rather 
than after the estate has been conclusively divided.  See 
Howard Delivery Serv. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 
657 n.3 (2006) (decision regarding the priority of a claim is 
final and appealable); see also In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 
711 F.2d 441, 445-46 (1st Cir. 1983) (same).   
 
To the extent that this appeal involves a question of 
law regarding whether withdrawal liability, or at least a 
portion thereof, can qualify as an administrative expense 
under the Bankruptcy Code, our review is de novo.  
Schlumberger Res. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. CellNet Data Sys., 




As mentioned, the question in this case is whether 
withdrawal liability, as defined by ERISA, as amended by the 
MPPAA, should be apportioned between pre- and post-
petition periods and, if so, whether the post-petition portion 
qualifies as an administrative expense as defined by the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Accordingly, we begin with the language 
of the statutes.   
 
Title 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code 
provides that administrative expenses allowed under § 503(b) 
are entitled to priority over the claims of general unsecured 
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creditors.  Section 503(b)(1)(A) defines administrative 
expenses as “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of 
preserving the estate including . . . wages, salaries, and 
commissions for services rendered after the commencement 
of the case [i.e. after the filing of the bankruptcy petition].”  
Interpreting this provision, we have explained that in order to 
qualify for administrative priority, an expense “must arise 
from a [post-petition] transaction with the debtor-in-
possession” and the expense “must be beneficial to the 
debtor-in-possession in the operation of the business.”  In re 
O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527, 532-33 (3d Cir. 
1999) (quotations and brackets omitted).  Pursuant to the 
statute‟s terms, the expense must also be actual and 
necessary.  Id.   
 
These requirements balance two important goals.  By 
giving priority to those claims that help keep the debtor-in-
possession functioning, “sections 503 and 507 advance the 
estate‟s interest in survival above all other financial goals.”  
Zagata Fabricators, Inc. v. Superior Air Prods., 893 F.2d 
624, 627 (3d Cir. 1990).  By limiting priority to those claims 
that are actual and necessary, the Code prevents the estate 
from being consumed by administrative expenses, and 
preserves the estate for the benefit of the creditors.  See Pa. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Res. v. Tri-State Clinical Labs, Inc., 178 F.3d 
685, 690 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that “Chapter 11 is intended 
to rehabilitate the debtor and avoid forfeiture by creditors”) 
(quotations and brackets omitted).  Consistent with the 
objective of preserving the estate for creditors, the burden to 
demonstrate that an expense deserves administrative priority 
lies with the party asserting such priority, here, the TENJ 
Pension Fund.  See In re O’Brien, 181 F.3d at 533.   
 
Thus, as applied to this case, the relevant inquiry is 
whether any portion of the withdrawal liability owed by 
Marcal LLC to the TENJ Pension Fund is a post-petition 
expense provided in exchange for a service that was actual 
and necessary for the continued operation of DIP Marcal.  In 
this regard, it is helpful to distinguish between the nature of 
withdrawal liability and how withdrawal liability is 




The MPPAA instituted withdrawal liability in response 
to a shortcoming in the original ERISA statute regulating 
multiemployer defined benefit pension plans.  A defined 
benefit plan, such as the TENJ Pension Fund plan, “is a 
pension plan under which an employee receives a set monthly 
amount upon retirement for his or her life, with the benefit 
amount typically based upon the participant‟s wages and 
length of service.”  In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 
589 F.3d 585, 595 n.8 (3d Cir. 2009).  In other words, the 
employer has promised the employee a certain pension 
benefit.  The benefit level is set by the plan trustee based on 
the “expected resources” of the plan.  Joint Explanation of S. 
1076: Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 
126 Cong. Rec. S20189, S20191 (July 29, 1980) (“Joint 
Explanation”).  “The resources of a plan available to pay 
those benefits consist of assets held by the plan.”  Id. at 
S20191.  Those assets include, “[f]uture contributions 
expected by the plan and income expected to be earned on 
plan investments.”  Id.  Accordingly, in a defined benefit 
plan, the employer‟s continuing contributions to the plan are 
designed to provide a subsequent benefit to the employee 
upon retirement.
1
   
 
As set forth in the Joint Explanation, even if an 
employer has made all of its contributions to date, “[b]ecause 
benefit promises may be funded over many years after they 
are made, the withdrawing employer may not have made 
sufficient contributions to the plan to fund a fair share of the 
                                              
1
 See Marcal‟s Motion to Reclassify the Administrative 
Proofs of Claim of the TENJ Pension Fund, App. at 352 
(“The CBA required, among other things, that the Debtors 
pay certain benefits and make contributions to the 
Teamsters Union‟s health, welfare and pension funds, 
including the Teamsters Union‟s multiemployer pension 
plan.”).  We note that the TENJ Pension Plan itself was 
not submitted on appeal or contained in the record below.  
Nevertheless, there appears to be no dispute regarding the 




cost of those benefit promises.”  Id. at S20192.  In contrast, a 
“defined contribution plan is a retirement plan whereby the 
employer, employee, or both make contributions to an 
individual‟s account during employment, but with no 
guaranteed retirement benefit, and with the ultimate benefit 
based exclusively upon the contributions to, and investment 
earnings of the plan.  The benefit ceases when the account 
balance is depleted, regardless of the retiree‟s age or 
circumstances.”  In re Schering Plough, 589 F.3d at 595 n.8. 
 
As explained in the “General Reasons for the Bill” 
section of the Joint Explanation, ERISA, in its original form, 
allowed employers to withdraw from defined benefit plans 
and escape their obligations to provide benefits, crippling the 
plan.  “One of the most serious threats to the security of 
benefits under a multiemployer plan is an unanticipated 
decline in employment covered by the plan.  Where this 
occurs, the plan is unlikely to have the resources necessary to 
provide benefits promised to employees. . . . Under ERISA, 
an employer who has paid all required contributions to a 
multiemployer [plan] can withdraw from the plan and, if the 
plan does not terminate within 5 years after the withdrawal, 
the employer will have no further responsibility for any part 
of the unfunded liabilities of the plan.”  Joint Explanation at 
S20191-92.
2
   Withdrawal liability was implemented to 
                                              
       
2
 Put even more forcefully by the House Report:  
“The current rules for employer liability upon the 
withdrawal of the employer are inequitable and 
dysfunctional because: (1) employers who withdraw from 
a plan early are rewarded, while employers who remain 
with a plan are penalized, and (2) there is no provision for 
compensation to a multiemployer plan for a withdrawal.”  
H.R. Rep. No. 96-869(1), at 60 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2918, 2928 (“House Report”); see also Trs. 
of Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. McFarlin’s, Inc. (In re 
McFarlin’s, Inc.), 789 F.2d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1986) (“As 
originally structured ERISA allowed some employers to 
withdraw from pension plans without requiring them to 
pay for benefits promised to and earned by their 
employees . . . . The withdrawal of employers allowed 
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alleviate this problem and ensure that employers could not 
avoid their obligation to provide a promised benefit by 
withdrawing, thereby hurting their employees and the entire 
pension fund‟s health.   
 
With an understanding of the purpose of withdrawal 
liability and the problem it was designed to repair, we can 
examine how it did so.  The MPPAA provides that if an 
employer withdraws from a multiemployer plan, then the 
employer is liable for its proportionate share of the “unfunded 
vested benefits.”  29 U.S.C. § 1381(b)(1).  Unfunded vested 
benefits are “calculated as the difference between the present 
value of vested benefits and the current value of the plan‟s 
assets.”  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 
U.S. 717, 725 (1984).  Section 1391 of the MPPAA provides 
various methods for calculating what portion of the plan‟s 
underfunding is allocable to a particular employer as its 
withdrawal liability.  And the plan trustee possesses the 
discretion to choose which method of calculation to employ 
(although the plan‟s final actuarial calculation may be 
challenged by the employer).  See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of 
Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 
609, 611 (1993).  Broadly speaking, the Act “requires that a 
withdrawing employer continue funding a proportional share 
of the plan‟s unfunded benefit obligations.”  House Report, 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2918, 2935 (emphasis added).   
 
Section 1391 “extrapolate[s] the employer‟s 
proportionate share of the plan‟s unfunded, vested benefits 
from such factors as the employer‟s past contributions to the 
plan and the portion of the plan‟s unfunded benefit 
obligations attributable to the employer‟s employees.”  In re 
McFarlin’s, 789 F.2d at 103.  Although the calculation can be 
quite “complex . . . [it] is based largely on the withdrawing 
employer‟s contribution history over the five . . . years 
preceding the withdrawal.”  CenTra, Inc. v. Cent. States Se. & 
Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 578 F.3d 592, 599-600 (7th Cir. 
                                                                                                     
them to leave plans without fully funding the benefits 
vested in, and therefore earned by, their employees up to 
the time of the withdrawal.”).   
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2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1885 (2010).  Indeed, in this 
case, both parties agree that a withdrawing employer‟s 
proportionate share of the unfunded vested benefits is “based 
on [the] contributions [it was obligated to pay] for the 5 years 
preceding withdrawal.”  Appellant‟s Br. at 21 n.3; see also 
Appellee‟s Br. at 20.   
 
To summarize, withdrawal liability is calculated by, 
first, determining the plan-wide shortfall between the plan 
assets and the vested benefits the plan owes to employees.  
Second, once the overall size of the shortfall has been 
determined, the withdrawing employer‟s share of that 
shortfall is determined by calculating, in essence, the 
proportionate share owed to the withdrawing employer‟s 
covered employees based on the employer‟s contribution 
share over the prior five years.   
 
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the covered 
employees were required to perform work post-petition in 
order to keep DIP Marcal in operation, unquestionably 
conferring a benefit to the estate.  Pursuant to the continued-
CBA and pension plan, Marcal promised to provide pension 
benefits in exchange for that post-petition work.  The portion 
of the withdrawal liability which corresponds to that post-
petition work is owed by Marcal LLC in fulfillment of the 
promise it assumed as part of its purchase of Marcal‟s assets 
to provide pension benefits in consideration for that necessary 
post-petition work.  Therefore, the requirements of 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 503(b)(1)(A) & 507(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code are 
satisfied.  We agree with the District Court and hold that the 
portion of the withdrawal liability attributable to the post-
petition period is entitled to administrative priority.   
 
Marcal LLC advances two principal arguments in 
opposition to this conclusion, neither of which is persuasive.  
First, it argues that because the amount of its withdrawal 
liability will be based on a variety of factors, some of which 
have nothing to do with the work performed by the covered 
employees, withdrawal liability cannot be considered an 
administrative expense.  Without question, the existence of 
withdrawal liability and its size will depend on how the 
11 
 
Fund‟s assets have fared in the market, how much money has 
been withdrawn by retired employees, and other actuarial 
assumptions.  But that does not alter the fact that the amount 
owed to the TENJ Pension Fund is based upon Marcal‟s 
decision to take advantage of work provided by covered 
employees.  In turn, the portion of that employee work that 
occurred post-petition was wholly dependent upon DIP 
Marcal‟s decision to employ covered teamsters while 
operating as a debtor-in-possession.  It is simply not seemly 
for Marcal LLC to disclaim responsibility for the vested 
benefits Marcal created by choosing to use covered 
employees to perform post-petition work.   
 
The size of the benefit owed to a particular employee 
is determined, in part, by the amount of time that employee 
worked for Marcal.  In re Schering Plough, 589 F.3d at 595 
n.8.  To the extent that the employees worked for Marcal 
post-petition, they continued to accrue new vested benefits 
under the CBA and the TENJ Pension Fund plan.  The 
following is the District Court‟s helpful explanation:   
 
The obligation to make [a withdrawal liability] 
payment . . . would not exist but for the insolvent 
employer‟s deliberate decision to use the services of 
the covered employees pursuant to the terms of 
compensation negotiated in the collective bargaining 
agreement.  Put differently, a portion of the accelerated 
pension funding [the withdrawal liability] is premised 
on the bargaining unit employees‟ earned credit toward 
their future right to collect pension benefits in 
consideration of their work for the debtor in 
possession.  Instead of financing the deferred 
compensation through monthly contributions, as it 
would do if it continued to participate in the 
multiemployer fund, the withdrawing employer is 
required to make a lump sum payment to the fund.  
Neither this requirement, nor the existence of 
insurance provided by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation for benefits owed to covered employees 
by the fund, alter the basic character of the 
withdrawing employer‟s debt - that is, incurred in 
12 
 
return for the employees‟ service to the employer post-
petition.   
 
Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc., 2009 WL 
3681897, at *7.  
 
 The Second Circuit in In re McFarlin’s echoes this 
conclusion:  “An employer‟s withdrawal liability payment . . . 
is the means by which the employer funds benefits that his 
employees have „earned‟ by their past service and that he 
would normally finance through continuing contributions to 
his employees‟ pension plan.”  789 F.2d at 104.  Accordingly, 
to the extent that a portion of the benefits correlate to the 
employees‟ post-petition service, the benefit is akin to direct 
compensation provided in exchange for post-petition services, 
which undisputedly qualifies as an administrative expense.  
See Howard Delivery Serv., 547 U.S. at 659 (noting that 
employee benefits compliment and/or substitute hourly wage 
compensation).  
 
Although Marcal LLC paints the amount of 
withdrawal liability it owes as wholly subject to the whims of 
the market and actuarial assumptions, it ignores the fact that 
pursuant to Marcal‟s agreement to provide a defined benefit, 
it assumed those risks with open eyes.  Marcal LLC‟s 
continued emphasis on the fact that Marcal had made all 
required plan contributions is a red herring; Marcal‟s promise 
to its employees was not just to provide contributions, but to 
provide a certain benefit.  As we have explained, “[u]nfunded 
vested benefits [from which withdrawal liability is calculated] 
are benefits which are „promised and earned but not yet 
funded‟ as of the calculation day.  The liability for [unfunded 
vested benefits] represents a pre-existing obligation on the 
employer‟s part, and is not simply „incurred‟ as of the date of 
withdrawal.  In other words, the unfunded vested benefit 
calculation represents an employer‟s share of the amount 
needed for a fund to break even as of the calculation date.”  
Huber v. Casablanca Indus., Inc., 916 F.2d 85, 96 (3d Cir. 
1990), overruled on other grounds by Milwaukee Brewery 
Workers’ Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 513 U.S. 
414 (1995) (internal citation omitted).  Put differently, 
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withdrawal liability is intended to make up for any deficiency 
in the fund‟s assets—any such deficiency would prevent the 
employer from fulfilling its promise to provide a specific 
retirement benefit, a promise which is made in exchange for 
the employees‟ work.   
 
 Marcal LLC‟s second argument is that withdrawal 
liability is not designed to benefit the employees who provide 
the post-petition service.  Instead, it argues, withdrawal 
liability is intended to benefit (1) the other employers within 
the TENJ Pension Fund, (2) the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation insurance scheme which may have to make up 
any shortfall, and (3) all of the employee-beneficiaries of the 
plan, not just those who worked for Marcal.  Importantly, 
Marcal LLC concedes that withdrawal liability is, at least in 
part, designed to benefit the employee-beneficiaries who 
worked for Marcal.     
 
 Although both the Senate and House explanations for 
the MPPAA discuss how withdrawal liability would protect 
the other employers and prevent collapse of the plan, the 
simple fact is that the plan exists for the benefit of the 
employees.  The legislative history of the MPPAA 
emphasizes that absent withdrawal liability, the employees 
are harmed.  See, e.g., Joint Explanation at S20191-92 (noting 
that when withdrawal occurs, “the plan is unlikely to have the 
resources necessary to provide benefits promised to 
employees” and that the reasons for the change are “that the 
current rules governing an employer‟s liability upon 
withdrawal from a multiemployer plan fail adequately to 
protect plan participants, the employers who remain in the 
plan, and the PBGC premium payers”) (emphasis added).  
Because withdrawal liability ensures that there are enough 
plan assets to provide promised benefits, it is provided in 
consideration for the employees‟ willingness to continue to 
work.
3
    
                                              
3
 Marcal LLC also contends that withdrawal liability is 
not based on “services rendered” to the estate.  
Appellant‟s Br. at 16, 21.  As explained, because 
withdrawal liability is based on the proportional amount 
14 
 
Finally, Marcal LLC contends that even if withdrawal 
liability is, in part, consideration in exchange for employees‟ 
post-petition work on behalf of the debtor-in-possession, the 
amount attributable to the post-petition work cannot be 
calculated.  We see no reason why the post-petition 
withdrawal liability is incapable of calculation.
4
  To the 
extent that withdrawal liability includes new vested benefits 
that arose from the post-petition work of covered employees, 
one can determine the extent to which those benefits have 
become underfunded.   
 
 Our conclusion that post-petition withdrawal liability 
should be classified as an administrative expense is consistent 
with decisions of other courts that have addressed the issue.   
The Second Circuit, the only other Court of Appeals to 
address this issue, has suggested that post-petition withdrawal 
liability can be considered an administrative expense.  In re 
McFarlin’s, Inc., 789 F.2d at 101-04.  Although the court in 
In re McFarlin’s ultimately declined to classify the 
withdrawal liability as an administrative expense, it did so 
because under the facts of that case the withdrawal liability 
was based on “a period pre-dating the McFarlin‟s Chapter 11 
proceeding and cannot therefore be treated as an 
administrative expense.”  Id. at 104 n.2.  The court‟s analysis 
                                                                                                     
of contributions the employer owed over the prior five 
years, which in turn was based on the amount of work the 
employees provided, withdrawal liability does bear a 
casual connection to services rendered.   
 
4
 The District Court did not calculate the post-petition 
portion of the withdrawal liability and left the calculation 
to the Bankruptcy Court on remand.  Trucking Emps. of N. 
Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc., 2009 WL 3681897, at *8.  
Accordingly, the actual calculation in this case is not 
before us.  To the extent that we discuss the possible 
calculation of the post-petition withdrawal liability, it is 
merely to demonstrate that it can be calculated and does 
not, as Marcal LLC suggests, prevent a portion of the 
withdrawal liability from being classified as an 
administrative expense.   
15 
 
clearly supports a conclusion that post-petition withdrawal 
liability can be considered an administrative expense.   
 
Other courts have reached the same conclusion.  See In 
re Great Ne. Lumber & Millwork Corp., 64 B.R. 426, 428 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (“the consideration supporting the 
withdrawal liability is . . . the same as that supporting the 
pensions themselves, the past labor of the employees . . . [t]o 
the extent that the withdrawal liability is attributable to 
postpetition employment, the claim would be entitled to 
administrative status”); In re Cott Corp., 47 B.R. 487, 495 
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (holding that withdrawal liability for 
the post-petition time period was an administrative claim and 
that withdrawal liability is capable of being divided).
5
   
 
 Third Circuit cases holding that other types of benefits 
can be apportioned between the pre- and post-petition period 
also support our conclusion.  In In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of 
Del., 298 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2002), the employer promised 
“Stay-On Benefits” to entice employees to continue working 
while the employer liquidated its assets.  The benefits were 
based on work the employees provided both pre- and post-
petition.  Id. at 225-26.  The employees argued that the entire 
benefit should be classified as an administrative expense 
                                              
5
  The case relied on most heavily by Marcal LLC is In 
re HNRC Dissolution Co., 396 B.R. 461 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 
2008).  We believe that this case was wrongly decided and 
that the BAP‟s conclusion runs afoul of some of its own 
analysis.  For example, the panel recognized that the 
debtor-in-possession “unquestionably” benefited from the 
continued work of the covered employees, but held that 
the consideration for this post-petition work was limited to 
the wages paid and accrual of other benefits, such as 
vacation.  Id. at 476.  However, as the panel recognized 
elsewhere, the post-petition work also accrued the 
employees‟ pension credits, entitling them to pension 
benefits.  Id. at 470.  To the extent withdrawal liability is 
an employer‟s consideration in order to ensure those 
benefits can be paid, it qualifies as an administrative 
expense.   
16 
 
because an employee could not receive the benefit unless he 
or she worked until the end of the liquidation.  Id. at 224-25.  
We rejected this claim, and held that to the extent the benefit 
was linked to both pre- and post-petition work, only that 
portion attributable to the post-petition period was entitled to 
priority.  Id. at 227.  There is no reason why the same should 
not hold true here.   
 
Similarly, in In re Roth Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 957 
(3d Cir. 1992), we held that vacation and severance benefits 
that were based on the length of employment “only have 
administrative priority to the extent that they are based on 
services provided to the bankruptcy estate post-petition.”   Put 
simply, many situations can arise whereby the promised 
employee benefit is in consideration for work that occurred 
both pre- and post-petition and we have held that the benefit 
should be and can be apportioned accordingly.  Withdrawal 
liability is one of those situations and we see no reason to 
treat it differently.   
 
 In holding that withdrawal liability can be apportioned 
between pre- and post-petition time periods and that the post-
petition portion can be classified as an administrative 
expense, we harmonize the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code 
and ERISA, as amended by the MPPAA, as we are required 
to do.  See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) 
(“The Courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among 
congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable 
of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly 
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard 
each as effective.”).  As discussed, the narrowly tailored 
definition of administrative expense contained in the 
Bankruptcy Code is designed to balance two goals:  the 
continued functioning of the debtor-in-possession and 
preservation of the estate for downstream creditors.  By 
allowing only that portion of withdrawal liability attributable 
to the post-petition work to be classified as an administrative 
expense, we ensure that workers are provided the full benefit 
of the bargain promised to them in the continued-CBA, 
incentivizing their work for the DIP and ensuring its 
continued functioning.  At the same time, by limiting what 
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constitutes an administrative expense to only that portion of 
the withdrawal liability which can be fairly allocated to the 
post-petition period, we help preserve the estate and prevent it 
from being devoured by the entire withdrawal liability claim.   
 
 Perhaps even more importantly, by permitting the 
post-petition portion of the withdrawal liability to be 
classified as an administrative expense, Congress‟ objectives 
in passing the MPPAA are fulfilled.  If withdrawal liability in 
its entirety were automatically classified as a general 
unsecured claim, it would greatly undercut the purpose of the 
MPPAA to secure the finances of pension funds and prevent 
an employer‟s withdrawal from negatively affecting the plan 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
and remand to the District Court for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
